Abstract Financial incentives in primary care have been introduced with the purpose of improving appropriateness of care and containing demand. We usually observe pay-for-performance programs, but alternatives, such as pay-for-participation in improvement activities and payfor-compliance with clinical guidelines, have also been implemented. Here, we assess the influence of different programs that ensure extra payments to GPs for containing avoidable hospitalisations. Our dataset covers patients and GPs of the Italian region Emilia-Romagna for the year 2005. By separating pay-for-performance from pay-forparticipation and pay-for-compliance programs, we estimate the impact of different financial incentives on the probability of avoidable hospitalisations. As dependent variable, we consider two different sets of conditions for which timely and effective primary care should be able to limit the need for hospital admission. The first is based on 27 medical diagnostic related groups that Emilia-Romagna identifies as at risk of inappropriateness in primary care, while the second refers to the internationally recognised ambulatory care-sensitive conditions. We show that payfor-performance schemes may have a significant effect over aggregate indicators of appropriateness, while the effectiveness of pay-for-participation schemes is adequately captured only by taking into account subpopulations affected by specific diseases. Moreover, the same scheme produces different effects on the two sets of indicators used, with performance improvements limited to the target explicitly addressed by the Italian policy maker. This evidence is consistent with the idea that a ''tunnel vision'' effect may occur when public authorities monitor specific sets of objectives as proxies for more general improvements in the quality of health care delivered.
Introduction
In recent years, efforts towards cost containment in healthcare have increased the need to identify where resources can be most efficiently targeted; primary care has also received increasing attention. To promote a higher quality of care, programs have been introduced throughout the world to ensure extra financial rewards are paid to GPs involved in care improvement activities. Such schemes frequently adopt a pay-for-performance structure, where payments are contingent on meeting indicators of provider effort. Alternatively, other strategies, each with its distinctive strengths and weaknesses, have been developed, with physicians rewarded for participation in improvement activities and/or for compliance with clinical guidelines.
For instance, the Quality and Outcomes Framework signed in 2003 in the UK is a mix of pay-for-performance and pay-for-compliance schemes that makes up a substantial part of GP's income (about 30%) contingent on attaining 146 quality indicators, covering clinical care for ten chronic diseases, organisation of care and patient experience. In the US, public and private payers have made available financial incentives (in the range of 1-10% of total revenues) to hospitals and other health care providers as well as to individual physicians participating in collecting information and/or meeting quality targets. In Italy, the experience of financial incentives is limited to primary care, and it accounts for only a small part of GP's total revenue.
Our study focuses on medical conditions where timely and effective provision of primary care should reduce the risk of hospitalisation and examines the influence on (potentially inappropriate) hospitalisations of different sets of programs providing economic incentives to GPs for improving appropriateness of care. More precisely, we analyse the impact of the use of economic incentives by regional and local health authorities (LHAs) in contracts for primary care in the Italian region Emilia-Romagna for the year 2005, distinguishing pay-for-performance from pay-for-participation and pay-for-compliance programs. We test the hypothesis that, other things equal, patients cared for by GPs that receive higher shares of their revenues from incentive-based programs are less likely to experience ''avoidable'' hospitalisations.
The paper adopts a general perspective in terms of study population and programs considered. By taking as reference the whole adult population and the full set of programs that provide financial incentives, we move away from the disease-based approach adopted in previous works [1] , although this comes at the cost of merging together programs pertaining to different areas. Through a comprehensive analysis, our aim is to evaluate the impact of this policy innovation, getting rid of the limitations implied by considering each program separately. For instance, a narrower approach that focuses only on specific diseases may fail to capture dysfunctional consequences such as the adoption of a ''tunnel vision'' attitude on part of GPs, as a response to performance monitoring, which induces a concentration of effort only on those areas included in the performance indicator scheme.
Taking a broad viewpoint is particularly important as the implications of a widespread use of economic incentives in the Italian primary care system are potentially twofold. Not only are they expected to improve results for the targets explicitly addressed, such as containing pharmaceutical prescriptions or reducing general hospitalisation rates, they are also intended as tools to improve the quality of care more generally by enforcing cooperation and inducing GPs, who are independent professionals contracted within the NHS, to take decisions in line with the general interest.
In other words, providing extra funds for clearly identified targets should (hopefully) improve quality of performance also on dimensions other than those strictly included in the contractual agreements, as a consequence of more cooperative GP attitudes.
Given these premises, we consider two indicators for avoidable admissions. The first measure refers to clinical conditions for which the regional government, by issuing official guidelines, has explicitly sought to promote the active participation of GPs in improving appropriateness, whereas the second indicator is an internationally accepted measure of avoidable hospitalisations. Nevertheless, neither of these measures has yet been directly targeted on a large scale by the system of financial incentives implemented at the district level.
The first indicator of potentially inappropriate hospitalisations relates to policy targets addressed explicitly by healthcare authorities. It corresponds to a list of 27 medical diagnostic related groups (DRGs) selected by the EmiliaRomagna region as at risk of inappropriateness in primary care. The second indicator is based on the ambulatory care sensitive conditions (ACSCs) developed by Billings et al. [2] . Admissions for ACSCs are ''avoidable'' in the sense that they refer to conditions (''chronic conditions'' such as diabetes and asthma, ''acute conditions'' such as ear/nose/throat infections, and ''preventable illnesses'' such as tetanus) that, if treated properly on an outpatient basis, should not require inpatient admission. Sometimes these admissions may be needed (ex-post), following a decline in the patient's health, but effective and timely ambulatory care should be able (exante) to prevent such a deterioration. Therefore, such hospitalisations are used in the literature to identify possible deficiencies in the quality of primary care services.
To summarise, thanks to the inclusion of different incentive schemes as explanatory variables, we have obtained information on the extent to which incentive structures influence performance. Moreover, by considering different dependent variables, we have also gained insight into the scope of such impacts. In particular, the first measure employed here (27 DRGs) aims at capturing the effectiveness of the programs on targets that have explicitly attracted the attention of policymakers, while ACSCs can be taken as a proxy for the gains in qualityinterpreted in a very broad sense-favoured by enhanced cooperation between GPs and other players in the system. Indeed, this latter measure displays several features favourable for this purpose. It is internationally validated as an indicator of good quality of primary care but is not endorsed as a policy target in the present institutional context. Moreover, it is defined according to very different criteria with respect to our first indicator (ICD-9-CM codes rather than DRGs), thus allowing for sufficient differentiation between the two variables.
The available dataset covers patients and GPs in the whole region, and provides detailed information on the health consumption of the population and on the different components of GP remunerations. In order to account for the hierarchical structure of the dataset, where patients can be grouped within GPs and GPs within districts, our empirical strategy is based on multilevel modelling [3] .
The role of incentives and motivation in health care
Our work contributes to the literature that studies how economic incentives can be used to improve the governance of institutions and organisations. Given the wide set of issues at stake and the extremely diversified situations that fall under such a framework, both the theoretical and the empirical literature provide mixed indications. Agency theory assumes that strong monitoring by the principal should motivate the agent to increase effort in order to reduce his penalty if caught shirking [4, 5] . Conversely, following the ''crowding out'' theory [6] , intensive monitoring could be considered as a signal of lack of trust and diminish effort by reducing preexisting intrinsic motivations. The same result could hold in the case of rewards. The premise of pay-to-perform schemes is to increase agents' marginal benefit of effort towards work outcomes relative to opportunity costs, but introducing monetary rewards to compensate performance on a task that has been previously undertaken without any immediate monetary remuneration can actually reduce performance. Gneezy and Rustichini [7] argue that this may be related to the size of the monetary incentive, with crowding out most likely to occur with modest payments. On the contrary, external interventions could also crowd ''in'' intrinsic motivation; when there is a high degree of perceived autonomy, discretion and freedom in work activity, personal relationships predominate and employees participate in decision making. In this context, the principal could signal his confidence in the agent's ability and strengthen the agent's intrinsic motivation over the long term.
Empirical studies of the effects produced by pay-forperformance schemes in the private sector show that firms experience significant increases in productivity when switching from a flat salary scheme to a pay-for-output scheme, whereas firms occasionally suffer decreases in quality when quality is not easily contractible [8] . Studies of performance pay reforms in the public sector focus mostly on sporadic intervention programs and show mixed results [9, 10] . Skeptics of high-powered incentives in public organisations argue that using pay-for-performance schemes in the public sector could have unintended consequences on workers' behaviour and induce extensive gaming by public employees, which may lower their productivity [11, 12] .
Examining the principal/agent relationship between purchaser and provider in healthcare, Goddard et al. [13] stress the risks associated with the design of compensation mechanisms related to performance. The incompleteness of many measures may lead to so-called ''tunnel vision'', i.e. a concentration on areas included in the performance indicator scheme to the exclusion of other unmeasured areas, but also to some sort of ''myopia'' when the effort is concentrated on short-term issues, excluding long-term activities that may influence performance measures only in many years time. Besides, when outcomes depend on the joint effort of a number of agencies, it is very difficult to design adequate incentive schemes that are able to encourage cooperation, and it becomes possible that only local, relatively narrow, objectives are pursued at the expense of the general organisation's objectives. This could also be relevant if it is in the power of the agent to manipulate the reported data, giving rise to ''mis-representation'' of reported performance. Finally, when multiperiod systems of targets and rewards are used, there is a danger of creating a ''ratchet effect'' when a good performance in one year is punished with higher future targets, thereby giving the agent a strong incentive to report persistently mediocre level of performance.
Pay-to-perform schemes in healthcare have been increasingly adopted internationally. The focus of these initiatives ranges from hospital to primary care, and a variety of methods have been used to design the incentives and to assess their effects on quality. For the 1999 Australian pay-for-performance scheme for GP remuneration in chronic disease management, Scott et al. [14] find a positive moderate effect on quality of diabetes care. In the US, Cutler [15] reports that the empirical evidence to date is ''more positive than negative'', in the sense that payment incentives result in some positive impact on the quality of care, but the effects are not all in the same direction. In the English pay-for-performance program, there is evidence of an increase in the quality of care during the first few years, but also evidence of gaming and tunnel vision effects [16] .
To overcome these unintended side effects, health economists have suggested some broad strategies [17, 18] . The first entails enhancement of the information set on which both principal and agent take their decisions, in order to reduce the scope for misdirected effort, and the development of performance benchmarks that are independent of past activity. Another strategy has to do with the degree of dissonance between the objectives of principal and agent [19, 20] . In this case, the idea is to create a ''culture change'', i.e. to foster a closer alignment between their objectives, promoting a favourable cultural environment and encouraging clinical professionals themselves to develop a common culture that might contribute to solve the agency problem. Following this strategy, payers explore alternative solutions for raising quality standards such as pay-for-participation programs or pay-for-compliance programs. Both solutions generate a looser incentive structure with respect to pay-for-performance, since payments are conditional not on the accomplishment of precise, measurable targets, but on the personal involvement of GPs in programs aimed at improving the quality of care for specific diseases and/or adherence to clinical protocols. The (still very limited) empirical literature on the topic, based mainly on surgical care, outlines that there are cases where this kind of incentive may prove more effective in improving the quality of care [21] . One of the potential advantages is physicians' greater acceptance of this approach, together with significant improvements in providers' adherence to evidence-based best practices. Nevertheless, incentive schemes that do not condition payments to the achievement of pre-defined individual targets may strongly attenuate any influence on physician behaviour.
Primary care organisation and strategies for appropriateness
In the last 15 years, significant changes introduced in the Italian NHS have widened regional powers in the organisation and the provision of healthcare. This process has gone hand-in-hand with an increase in the direct financial responsibilities of regional governments according to the principles of fiscal federalism. Regarding primary care, a series of reforms implemented in the 1990s have enhanced the integration between district and primary care services and reinforced group practices. Moreover, these reforms have set the basis for introducing additional financial rewards to GPs for meeting specific policy goals.
The responsibility for organising primary care, and, more generally, non-hospital services, is attributed to health districts grouped into LHAs. The relationship between the NHS and GPs, who are independent professionals acting as gatekeepers to secondary care, is regulated through contractual agreements, which set out, among other things, the remuneration profile. Capitation is the primary source of GPs' remuneration and money follows patients' decisions to enroll with a particular GP. GPs may operate individually or share clinic premises and coordinate their activity with one or more colleagues but this does not lead to lists of patients jointly followed by groups of GPs, as in Italy the physician-patient relationship is always a personal one. This institutional feature ensures that patients and GPs can be represented as two hierarchically ordered layers, with the former group nested within the latter.
In recent years, a maximum limit of 1,500 patients has been introduced; GPs already exceeding this threshold can keep their additional patients but they cannot add new ones. In addition, GPs also receive fee-for-service compensations for providing specific treatments such as minor surgery, preventive activities and post surgery follow-ups. Both the fixed (capitation) and the variable (fee-for service) components are negotiated between the GPs' trade unions and central government, and are uniform nationwide.
On top of these compensations, each region can introduce a third component of remuneration, typically aimed at promoting appropriateness of care and cost containment. Indeed, consistent with policy guidelines and the institutional framework designed by each region, LHAs and health districts can negotiate autonomously with local organisations of GPs for additional payments for specific programs that address priority targets identified at the local level.
In Emilia-Romagna, the regional government has devoted substantial effort to enhancing appropriate use of hospital services. Using DRGs and disease staging, a classification was developed to identify cases of potentially inappropriate hospitalisations. To assist LHA managers in identifying the appropriate level of alternative, low intensity, treatment settings for patients who do not need acute care hospitalisation, in 2004 the Regional Health Authority produced an Atlas of appropriateness of hospital use. In the case of primary care, since 2001 the LHAs have involved GPs in policies aimed at substituting hospital with community-based care, for conditions typically associated with chronic pathologies such as diabetes, asthma, chronic obstructive pulmonary disease, congestive heart failure, hypertension and psychiatric disorders. Regional guidelines have been issued in order to encourage cooperation between primary and secondary care providers.
Pay-for-performance programs are characterised by a strict link between financial transfer and target achievements to be verified ex-post. In Emilia Romagna, they are negotiated between districts or LHAs and GP trade unions. Examples are financial rewards for GPs that meet targets for the prescription rate of generic relative to non-generic drugs, or extra payments for GPs who keep hospitalisation rates below predefined thresholds. Usually, the financial rewards adjust to the performance level, according to a graduated scale that begins at the attainment of a minimum threshold and increases up to a maximum level. In primary care, GPs receive financial incentives to deliver high quality services that improve clinical and organisational appropriateness. The main target indicators refer to pathologies for which GPs have a stronger potential of influencing the rate of inappropriateness in the setting of care. For example, some local contracts provide financial incentives to contain the standardised ordinary hospitalisation rate, to decrease the emergency admissions rate, and to reduce hospitalisation for elderly patients by strengthening the capacity of the home and community care system.
Pay-for-participation schemes consist of a (heterogeneous) group of programs aimed at encouraging physician participation in the management of specific conditions (e.g. diabetes, hypertension, oncology, asthma and dementia), which require additional efforts devoted directly to each diagnosed patient. These payments can be labelled ''payfor-participation'' because the financial bonus does not depend on the achievement of specific targets as in pay-for performance. For instance, various districts-though not all-have developed programs that require physicians to take part in local diabetes management plans through which GPs are entitled to a financial bonus for the assumption of responsibility for each diabetic patient. GPs in charge of providing care to individuals expected to require higher than average effort-e.g. type II diabetic patients-receive an extra payment that supplements standard capitation. A key feature of ''pay-for-participation'' is that the amount received by GPs is defined on a per-patient basis and therefore depends on the number of patients with the diagnosed disease falling under his responsibility rather than on some measure of performance as would be the case for reduction in avoidable hospitalisations.
Finally, pay-for-compliance schemes introduce financial transfers to GPs who take part in various activities that promote cooperation with professionals in charge of other levels of care. Additional compensations are provided for attending audit meetings, for actively participating in the development of new protocols and guidelines, or for implementing evidence-based best practice, such as increasing influenza immunisation uptake for the elderly and uptake of breast and cervical cancer screenings, or to increase the local rate of domiciliary care. In this case, in contrast to pay-for-participation, GPs' compensation is related not to the number of patients included in GP's list, but rather to the number of activities the physician is involved in.
Data and estimation issues
Our dataset covers year the 2005. The initial database was restricted according to two criteria. First, we considered only patients aged between 18 and 74 years. Since agerelated risk factors may affect advice regarding hospitalisation for the sets of conditions included as dependent variables in the analysis (ACSCs and 27 DRGs), such episodes cannot be taken as a reliable proxy for poor quality of primary care in older patients. Second, we limited our sample to GPs whose list size is above 100, since a shorter list suggests that the GP is not working as a fulltime primary care physician. By introducing these thresholds, the sample used for the estimations encompasses 2,784,099 patients and 3,095 GPs.
We consider two dependent variables, both identified by hospital discharge data collected through a system of hospital-based reporting. The first indicator is based on the list of 27 medical DRGs at risk of inappropriateness in primary care identified by the Region (Model A) and listed in the Regional resolution 319/2000 ( Table 1 ). The total number of inappropriate admissions identified according to this criterion amounts to 11,552 (0.4% of the study population). In the second case, the dependent variable takes the value 1 if the patient has been hospitalised for an episode classified as ACSCs (Model B) and 0 otherwise. We adopt here the list of ACSCs coded using the International classification of diseases (ICD-9-CM) [2, 22] . We classify hospitalisations as inappropriate if at least one of the ICD-9-CM codes included in the ACSCs' list is recorded as the primary reason for admission (see Table 2 ). The total number of ACSC admissions recorded in the dataset amounts to 16,924, which corresponds to 0.58% of the study population. Table 3 presents a cross tabulation of DRGs and ACSCs. Although both indicators proxy poor quality of primary care, the different criteria according to which they are defined lead to a limited overlap of events. In particular, only one-third of cases identified as 1 according to the DRG criterion are the same also under the ACSCs criterion (3,918 out of 11,552), and less than one-fourth of the events classified as ACSCs are associated to 1 of the 27 DRGs (3,918 out of 16, 924) .
We recorded detailed information at the patient, GP and district level (Table 4 ). Patient characteristics included [23, 24] . The Charlson index is a weighted index of patient comorbidity, computed from the ICD-9-CM diagnostic and procedure codes available in administrative datasets other than the principal ones and according to their potential for influencing mortality. The use of such an indicator ensures a more precise control for case mix, and works as a proxy for severity at patient level. Regarding GPs, we control for GP gender, age, practice location in urban areas and for type of practice, distinguishing single-handed from group practices. We also include information on list size and on the average age of the patients included. We aggregated the financial incentives received by GPs as a variable part of their remuneration into three groups: pay-for-performance, pay-for-participation and pay-forcompliance. In order to get rid of scale effects due to list size, these variables are measured as share of GPs annual income. Figure 1 displays the distribution of the three groups of incentives among the 39 regional districts. The share of total income received through the three schemes varies considerably among GPs. This is due, in the first instance, to the variability in the financial size of the programs recorded across districts.
As regards the district level, we investigated the influence of local conditions by including controls for supply side characteristics such as hospital beds and district hospitalisation rates.
Patients are clustered according to the GP they are enrolled with and, in turn, GPs are clustered according to the district they work in. Grouping of observations may determine the presence of (unobserved) common factors among the units that belong to the same group. Having to deal with data characterised by such a hierarchical structure, our empirical strategy is based on multilevel modelling [25] . This estimation technique has the advantage of allowing the Var/Cov matrix of the error terms to account for possible correlation of observations belonging to the same layer. In this way, a correction is introduced into the size of the standard errors and appropriate confidence intervals can be computed [26] .
Our estimates included three different layers: the patient (i), the GP (j) and the district (k). Given the dichotomous nature of the dependent variable, we estimate the following three-level logit model:
where p ijk corresponds to Pr y ijk ¼ 1 X ijk ; m 0k ; u 0jk À Á and y ijk is the realisation of a random variable Y ijk assumed to follow a Bernoulli distribution with parameter p ijk . Here, p ijk represents the probability that a patient i falling under the responsibility of GP j in district k is hospitalised for an episode that is classified as avoidable admission. We estimate model (1) regressing two alternative dichotomous indicators, expressed by a list of DRGs at risk of inappropriateness and ACSCs, against the same set of explanatory variables. The random component of the estimated equation comprises three distinct parts, which represent the random errors for the patient (e ijk ), GP (u 0jk) and district (v 0k ) level, respectively. Our distributional Incentives in primary care and their impact on potentially avoidable hospital admissions 303 assumptions considered random components at different levels to be uncorrelated and normally distributed, while we permitted observations referring to patients cared by the same physician or in the same district to be correlated [27] . We also computed the intraclass correlation coefficients (ICCs) q h as estimates of the share of the total variance that potentially refers to each layer h [28] .
For each dependent variable, we estimated a three-level logit model where GPs are nested within districts. Estimations were carried out with the SAS GLIMMIX procedure, using the IGLS algorithm with a pseudolikelihood procedure. We took deviance as a measure of goodness-of-fit, and significance of the coefficients was assessed through the Wald statistic [3] . Table 5 presents estimates of Eq. 1 for the two dependent variables (Model A-DRGs and Model B-ACSCs). In both cases, we consider a three-level logit model.
Empirical results
For both models, the estimated variances at the GP and district level are significant [Level 2-r 2 (u 0jk ). Level 3-r 2 (v 0k )]. This result indicates that nesting across local areas and GPs is still relevant even after controlling for observable patients', physicians' and districts' characteristics. Moreover, from a comparison between the two estimated ICCs (q GP and q districts ) we can see that unexplained variability is larger at the district than at the GP level.
Patients' characteristics, adjusted for differences in the case-mix across practices, are significant in both Models A and B. Interestingly, despite the use of different dependent variables, not only the signs and significance levels, but also the coefficients are fairly comparable across specifications. In particular, male, older patients as well as those reporting more comorbidities, display a higher probability of incurring avoidable hospitalisations. The sign of the parameters for patient age suggests that the estimated (non linear) relationship is represented by a convex function, with the probability of (avoidable) hospitalisation increasing at increasing rates at advanced stages of life. This result is in line with expectations because age can be seen as a good proxy for underlying severity of conditions that fail to be captured by the clinical indicators included in our regressions.
As regards physician characteristics, in both models the average age of the list and an urban location of the practice decrease the probability of hospitalisation for both dependent variables. In principle, there is scope for arguing that being included in a list where patients are older on average can either increase or decrease the probability of avoidable hospitalisations. Prior expectations on the sign of this variable are mixed since two effects pushing in opposite directions are potentially in place. On the one side, older patients impose a higher workload on the GP and therefore accuracy of care provided to each patient may fall. According to this ''overload effect'' we would expect a positive coefficient for list age. On the other side, a physician providing care to relatively old patients should be more used to effectively deal with complex cases thus reducing the probability of hospitalisation (''experience effect''). With the available information it is not possible to separately identify the two effects, although the negative sign for the coefficient of list age suggests that the experience effect prevails in our sample. Finally, younger GPs and those working in single-handed practices show a higher probability of having patients hospitalized for a DRG at risk of inappropriateness, while no significant difference is recorded when considering ACSCs.
The main policy question addressed in this paper concerns the role of financial incentives. Our results suggest that different programs produce a different impact. Payfor-participation programs are never significant. On the contrary, in one of the estimated models, both payfor-performance and pay-for-compliance-the latter more weakly-influence the probability of avoidable hospitalisations. Moreover, financial transfers aimed at improving the appropriateness of hospital referrals through additional financial transfers to GPs are effective if we take the list of 27 DRGs as reference, while they are not if one considers ACSCs. That is, we find a positive association between financial incentives and performances in primary care only if avoidable hospitalisations are measured according to conditions to which healthcare authorities have explicitly drawn GPs' attention (i.e. the 27 DRGs). From a policymaker's perspective, two lessons can be drawn. First, the result from the DRG model suggests that, when additional money is accompanied by active promotion of clearly identified policy objectives, such investments seem to be effective in inducing GPs to back the policymaker's effort for improving quality of care. At the same time, if we measure appropriateness of primary care through indicators widely used at the international levelsuch as ACSCs-but not explicitly endorsed in the present institutional context, no association is recorded between the share of revenues received through incentive-based programs and quality of primary care. This result can be interpreted as suggestive of the fact that we cannot find support for the optimistic view according to which provision of extra-money to GPs for specific programs improves quality of care also on dimensions that go beyond the targets identified by policymakers. ACSCs can be seen as a good proxy to capture such wider perspective since they are validated by the scientific community but here they are not identified as reference targets by public authorities and display a limited overlap with the DRGs on which public authorities have focused. In conclusion, our evidence indicates that not only the way incentive schemes are designed, but also the link between the target taken as reference and its institutional endorsement, is crucial.
A further remark concerns pay-for-participation programs, whose coefficient is not significant in either model. As financial transfers for these programs represent the largest share of extra-payments to GPs, one might wonder why they are not as effective as the others. This empirical puzzle can be explained by keeping in mind that, in this institutional context, pay-for-participation schemes are usually associated with the management of specific diseases such as diabetes, asthma or hypertension. Consequently, their impact is likely to be loosely measured when we refer to the general population rather than focusing on the groups of patients targeted by each program.
In order to test this hypothesis, we considered a specific chronic condition such as diabetes type II. To extract the sub-population of type-II diabetic patients, we exploited identifiers previously developed for a related study [1] . Adjustments with respect to models A and B have to be made in order to account for disease specific features. In particular, there are outcomes are given by the ACSC codes listed in Table 2 that refer to acute complications for diabetes (comas) that should be avoided through effective patient management. These are identified by hospital records in which ICD-9 codes 250.2-250.3 are documented as the primary, or most likely to be responsible, diagnosis. Table 6 presents the explanatory variables that, to a large extent, correspond to those employed in the general model, with the exception of the Charlson index, which substituted insulin dependence as proxy for the severity of this specific disease.
Consistently with the more focused approach adopted here, we considered only payments aimed at improving diabetes care, which in Emilia Romagna typically take the form of pay-for-participation programs. Figure 2 presents the distribution of this payment scheme among the 38 regional districts as a fraction of GPs' annual income (one district was excluded as its hospitalisation rates for diabetic comas were over ten times the regional average, probably due to a coding mistake). Finally, to account for supply side characteristics, we consider at the third level the presence of hospital diabetes specialised wards. Despite using data for a different year (2003 vs 2005) and a slightly different specification, the results presented in Table 7 confirm previous evidence [1] . Patients' characteristics are again strong predictors of the probability of hospitalisation. As for financial incentives, we observe a significant association between health outcomes and the additional payments provided to GPs through pay-forparticipation programs for diabetes care. This confirms that, given the design of incentives in the present institutional context, the role of pay-for-participation programs can be better evaluated if one takes a disease-based perspective, instead of the more aggregate approach adopted in this paper.
Conclusions
In this paper, we investigated the influence of economic incentives included in regional and LHA contracts for primary care in the Italian region of Emilia-Romagna (year 2005). We considered two different measures of avoidable admissions as dependent variables, and three groups of programs: pay-for-performance, pay-for-participation and pay-for-compliance. The first dependent variable was obtained from the list of 27 medical DRGs that EmiliaRomagna identifies as at risk of organisational inappropriateness in primary care, while the second was the rate of preventable hospitalisations measured by ACSCs.
Data clustering across LHAs and GPs led to the choice of multilevel modelling. Patients' characteristics emerged as the most important factor influencing the two dependent variables, and all coefficients are fairly robust across specifications. Several physician characteristics display a significant impact, especially when we consider the 27 medical DRGs. In this case, younger GPs, as well as those working in rural areas and in single handed practices show a higher probability to have their patients hospitalised for a condition at risk of inappropriateness.
From a policy perspective, the paper's main aim was to evaluate the impact of financial incentives introduced to promote good quality of primary care and, consequently, appropriate use of hospital resources. Two main results emerge from the analysis. First, taking two different sets of indicators as dependent variables produces different outcomes. When we refer to indicators, such as the list of 27 DRGs identified as important policy targets by the regional health authority, we find that, other things being equal, additional financial transfers reduce the probability of episodes of inappropriateness of care. Conversely, moving to P-value 0.53444 ***P B 0.01, ** PB 0.05, * P B 0.10 indicators such as ACSCs, which are internationally accepted, but for which no specific action has been undertaken for raising GPs awareness in the present institutional context, we observe no relationship between the amount of financial incentives received by a GP and the probability of his patients experiencing avoidable hospitalisations. This first result suggests that explicit institutional support is crucial to the success of quality improvement activities. A second important finding concerns the different impact produced by different types of programs. Our estimates show that, the larger the share of revenues provided to GPs through pay-for-performance programs, the lower the probability of their patients experiencing hospitalisation for the 27 DRGs at risk of inappropriateness. A similar result also holds for pay-for-compliance programs, although the coefficient is significant only at the 10% level. Conversely, pay-for-participation programs, despite providing a relatively larger amount of money, are never significant. We argue that the latter result is due to the fact that such schemes are used mostly for improving the management of particular diseases. Consequently, as we document for diabetes care, their impact is more precisely evaluated by choosing disease-specific outcomes as dependent variables rather than aggregate indicators.
We conclude with a few cautionary remarks. First, our analysis bears the limitations implicit in the use of crosssectional data for the identification of strong causal relationships. Nonetheless, it must be noted that incentive programs are contracted at the district level and, once an agreement is reached, GPs working in the district are part of this contract. This implies that the largest share of variability in economic incentives is recorded between, rather than within, districts. At the same time, movement of physicians across districts is extremely rare. The propensity of citizens to change GP is limited, and motivated mostly by changes in residence. In this context, the timespan required to create a sufficiently large list in a new district is so long that the (opportunity) costs of moving becomes prohibitive. This being the case, the possibility for a GP to participate in incentive-based programs is crucially influenced by the district of reference and by the policy developed thereby, but the choice of where to open the practice is typically taken once and for all and responds to criteria that initially were probably unrelated to the amount of incentives provided by each district. The large majority of GPs took this decision well before the start of incentivebased programs, and even for the younger physicians other considerations such as local market conditions are likely to be more important. Altogether, these institutional features greatly reduce the risk of endogeneity of economic incentives when measured at the level of the individual GP.
A second limitation concerns the difficulty of assessing the overall social and financial returns of the money invested for improving quality in primary care. Despite covering the general population and a wide set of conditions, the measure of benefits used in the paper is still narrow with respect to all potential improvements generated by incentive-based programs of the kind considered here. They can stimulate activities that produce better outcomes of care, or financial savings, that fail to be captured by reductions in avoidable hospitalisations. As long as expected benefits also pertain to dimensions that go beyond a more appropriate use of hospital resources, to provide conclusive statements in terms of cost benefit analysis for these policy actions calls for more comprehensive studies and our work can be seen as first step in this challenging direction.
